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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue No. I. Did the district court err in concluding as a matter of law based upon
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and based on the well-pleaded facts of the
amended complaint that each of Plaintiff7Appellant Russell/Packard Development, Inc.'s
("Russell/Packard") and PlaintiftfAppellant Lawrence M. Russell's ("Russell")
(collectively referred to as the "Russell Plaintiffs") claims are barred by the applicable
statutes of limitation? (R. at 64-68.)
Standard ofReview. A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed
for correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,1256 (Utah 1998). Under the
correctness standard, no deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law.
Id.
Issue No. 2. Did the district court err in concluding as a matter of law based upon
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and based on the well-pleaded facts of the
amended complaint that the Russell Plaintiffs lack standing to assert each of their claims?
(R. at 68-69, 39-42.)
Standard ofReview. A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed
for correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,1256 (Utah 1998). Under the
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correctness standard, no deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law.
Id.
Issue No. 3. Did the district court err in concluding as a matter of law based upon
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and based on the well-pleaded facts of the
amended complaint that the Russell Plaintiffs failed to plead with particularity facts
sufficient to support a claim for fraud? (R. at 1-18,69-70,72-91.)
Standard ofReview. A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed
for correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,1256 (Utah 1998). Under the
correctness standard, no deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law.
Id
Issue No. 4. Did the district court err in concluding as a matter of law based upon
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and based on the well-pleaded facts of the
amended complaint that Defendants/Appellees owed no fiduciary duties to the Russell
Plaintiffs? (R. at 70.)
Standard ofReview. A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed
for correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,1256 (Utah 1998). Under the
correctness standard, no deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law.
Id.

2

GOVERNING LAW
The following statutory provisions are of central importance to the outcome of this
appeal and are attached in their entirety in the Addendum: Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-1225(3), 78-12-26(4), 78-27-26; Rule 9(b), Utah R. Civ. P.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course ofProceedings and Disposition Below.

On November 30,2001, the Russell Plaintiffs filed a Complaint and Jury Demand
against Defendants/Appellees Joel Carson ("Carson"), William Bustos ("Bustos") and
John Thomas ("Thomas") (collectively referred to as the "Carson Defendants") asserting
eight separate claims: 1)fraud;2) breach of fiduciary duty; 3) civil conspiracy to defraud
and to breach duties; 4) commercial bribery; 5) unjust enrichment; 6) conversion and
misappropriation of proprietary property; 7) breach of principal-agency relationship; and
8) intentional interference with prospective economic relations. (R. at 1-18.) The Carson
Defendants eachfiledmotions to dismiss. (R. at 29-57.) In response, the Russell
Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand delineating more fully when
the applicable statutes of limitations were tolled and when they began to run as well as
amplifying the facts relating to standing. (R. at 72-91.) They alsofileda joint opposition
to the motions. (R. at 58-71.)
The district court conducted a hearing on and granted the motions. (R. at 149,
207.) Counsel for Carson prepared a proposed Order of Dismissal, to which the Russell
3

Plaintiffs objected. (R. at 150-152,193-194.) On June 10,2002 the district court entered
a Minute Entry denying the objection and signed an order dismissing the Russell
Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. (R. at 191-194.) The Russell Plaintiffs filed this appeal.
(R. at 195-197.)
B.

Statement ofFacts.
1.

Governing Factual Standard.

This district court's dismissal was made pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The
Utah Supreme Court has ruled that in deciding motions to dismiss, trial courts "must
'accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Prows
v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991) (citing #. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)). "[I]f there is any doubt about whether a claim
should be dismissed for lack of factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of
giving the party an opportunity to present its proof." Colman v. Utah State LandBd., 795
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (citingBaur v. Pac. Fin. Corp., 383 P.2d 397, 397 (1963)).
Under this standard, the facts set forth below are based upon those pled in the complaints
and must be accepted as true for purposes of this appeal.
2.

Facts Relating to the Transaction.

Russell/Packard is a real estate development corporation engaged in the
development and construction of residential homes. (R. at 75ffif15-17.) Russell is its
4

principal shareholder and Chief Executive Officer. (R. at 75 f 15.) Russell/Packard and
Russell formed a Utah limited liability company named PRP Development L.C. ("PRP")
with Thomas through Thomas'affiliation with Premier Homes, L.C. (R. at 75 ^ 18.) The
purpose of PRP was to develop and construct residential homes for retail sale in the State
of Utah. (Id.) Thomas was the manager of PRP. As such he became an agent and
fiduciary of the Russell Plaintiffs. (R. at 75 f 19,76 f 26.)
Saratoga Springs Development, L.L.C. ("Saratoga") owned 72 undeveloped twin
home lots in the city of Saratoga Springs, Utah County ("Saratoga Lots"). Saratoga had
retained the brokerage services of Wardley Better Homes and Gardens Real Estate
("Wardley") to market and sell the Saratoga Lots. Dan Cary ("Cary"), an agent with
Wardley, was the listing agent for the Saratoga Lots. (R. at 75-76ffif20-21.)
Carson and Bustos were also real estate agents with Wardley. (R. at 73ffl[3-4.) In
addition to being fellow Wardley employees, Carson had an independent business
relationship with Bustos and had previous dealings with Thomas in the real estate sales,
development and construction industry in Utah. At the time the Saratoga Lots were for
sale, Thomas owed Bustos significant sums of money from one of their previous business
dealings. (R. at 76ffij22-26.)
In the summer of 1996, Thomas, Bustos and Carson became aware of the
availability of the Saratoga Lots. (R. at 77 ^ 27.) They conspired and acted to cause what
is known as a "flip purchase and sale" of the Saratoga Lots. (R. at 77-80ffi[28-51.) They
5

used afictitiousentity named CMT, Inc. ("CMT") to purchase the Saratoga Lots for
$25,000 a piece and immediately resold them to PRP for $30,000 each, making a profit of
$360,000, despite the fact they were fiduciaries of Saratoga and the Russell Plaintiffs.
(Id)
The Carson Defendants accomplished their scheme as follows. Thomas
approached Cary about PRP purchasing the Saratoga Lots from Saratoga and retained
Carson to act as PRP's agent for this purpose. Thomas and Carson negotiated with Cary
for PRP to purchase the Saratoga Lots directly from Saratoga. (R. at 77ffi[28-30.)
During their negotiations, Carson and Thomas consistently referred to PRP as the builder
or buyer and Saratoga as the seller or developer. (R. at 80 If 56, 207 at pgs. 26-27.)
Carson and Thomas further lead Saratoga to believe PRP was purchasing the Saratoga
Lots directly from Saratoga by presenting to Saratoga, through Thomas' connection with
PRP, PRP's proprietary plans and drawings for the development and construction of the
Saratoga Lots. (R. at 78 Tf 41.)
In the fall of 1996, the Carson Defendants, formally offered to purchase the
Saratoga Lots from Saratoga for $25,000 each. The offer, however, names CMT as buyer
instead of PRP ("CMT Contract"). (R. at 77ffi[32-33.) Carson told Cary on several prior
occasions that CMT was affiliated with, a part of, or owned by PRP. (R. at 7 ^f 35, 78 ^f
35.) At the time the statements were made, CMT had no relationship with PRP. In fact,
CMT was not even an existing legal entity until its incorporation in California on
6

December 5,1996, over one month after executing the CMT Contract. CMT has never
registered to do business in the State of Utah. CMT was a fictitious entity controlled by
the Carson Defendants. (R. at 78ffif35-36.)
Believing CMT was affiliated with or a part of PRP, based on the representations
by the Carson Defendants, Saratoga agreed to sell the Saratoga Lots to CMT. On
November 4,1996, Saratoga and CMT executed the CMT Contract, which identifies
Carson as CMT's agent. (R. at 78-79ffif40-42.) That same day, the title company
received a $10,000 earnest money wire from an entity known as Poe Investments ("Poe").
Poe's members at that time were Carson and Bustos. (R. at 79 ^ 43.)
Also on November 4,1996, and not coincidentally, Thomas executed a formal
offer on behalf of PRP to purchase the Saratoga Lots from CMT for $30,000 each. (R. at
79K44.) The Russell Plaintiffs were led by the Carson Defendants to believe that CMT
was affiliated with, a part of, or owned by Saratoga and that PRP was purchasing the
Saratoga Lots directly from Saratoga, which is the manner in which the negotiations had
been conducted. (R. at 78 K 37.)
CMT of course accepted the offer and the deal was memorialized on November 8,
1996 ("PRP Contract"). (R. at 79 ^ 45.) Carson is listed in the PRP Contract as the agent
for both PRP and CMT. (R. at 79ffi[46-47.) The PRP Contract, like the CMT Contract,
references earnest money from PRP of $5,000. Thomas issued a checkfromPRP to
Superior Title for $5,000 dated only "November 1996" which references earnest money.
7

It, however, was never processed by the bank for payment. Instead, the $10,000 earnest
money wire under the CMT Contract referencing Poe was distributed at closing by checks
to Carson and to Bustos at their direction. (R. at 79-80 ^ 48.)
The CMT Contract and the PRP Contract had identical closing terms except for the
price. (R. 80 ^ 49.) The Carson Defendants, through CMT, interjected themselves as
undisclosed agents and principals for CMT and/or Poe while acting as agents and
fiduciaries of the Russell Plaintiffs to cause the flip purchase and sale for their own
benefit and at the expense of Saratoga and the Russell Plaintiffs. (R. at 80fflf50-51.)
Had the Russell Plaintiffs known of the flip sale and purchase, they would not have
consented to PRP's purchase of the Saratoga Lots from CMT. (R. at 80-81 ^ 54.)
Because of the actions and statements of the Carson Defendants, neither
Russell/Packard nor Russell discovered CMT was not the agent for, under the control of,
or otherwise acting for Saratoga until the Spring of 2000 when an accountant working for
Saratoga questioned the ownership or control status of CMT and discovered the
possibility of the flip sale and purchase while preparing for the closings on the final
twelve Saratoga Lots. (R. at 81 f 55.) It was thefirsttime the Russell Plaintiffs
discovered CMT was not the agent for, under the control of, or otherwise acting for
Saratoga. (R. at 81 ^ 58.) At all times previous to that, the Carson Defendants furthered
their scheme by consistently introducing Saratoga to the Russell Plaintiffs as the builder
or buyer and introducing Saratoga and its representatives the Russell Plaintiffs as the
8

seller or developer. Those representations not only lead Saratoga and the Russell
Plaintiffs to believe PRP was purchasing the lots directly from Saratoga but resulted in
the concealment until the Spring of 2000 of the fact CMT was not affiliated with either
PRP or Saratoga. (R. at 81ffif56 & 59.)
The Saratoga accountant's question about the ownership and control status of
CMT in connection with the closing of the last twelve of the lots led Saratoga to a search
to find a link between CMT and PRP or the Russell Plaintiffs. When no link could be
found, Saratoga contacted the Russell Plaintiffs to see of the Russell Plaintiffs could
explain the situation. (R. at 81 ^ 55.) This was when the Russell Plaintiffs were first
placed on notice that CMT was not affiliated with Saratoga, which led the Russell
Plaintiffs to further investigate the true nature of the transactions. (Id.) That investigation
concerning the ownership and control of CMT and the circumstances of the CMT
Contract and PRP Contract took over one year and revealed the true nature of the flip sale
and purchase. (R. at 81-82fflf55, 58- 60.) After learning these facts, the Russell
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint and Jury Demand on November 30,2001. (R. at 1-18.)
They did not file before then because they did not have an adequate factual basis
sufficient to establish any wrongful conduct.
3.

Facts Relating to Russell/Packard's and Russell's Standing.

In April 1997, the Russell Plaintiffs sold their interest in PRP to Premier Homes
Construction, L.C., a company in which Thomas was also a member. (R. at 39-42.) In
9

exchange, PRP paid Russell/Packard and Russell $5,000 and assigned Russell "all of its
right, title and interest in the [PRP] Contract and its right to acquire the Saratoga Property
at the time of closing." (R. at 39.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court granted the Carson Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motions "for the
reasons specified, both here at oral argument and in the supporting memoranda." (R. at
207 at pg. 47.) The Carson Defendants asserted the following identical arguments at oral
argument and in their briefs: 1) the Russell Plaintiffs5 claims are barred by the various
statutes of limitations; 2) the Russell Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue those claims; and
3) the Russell Plaintiffs failed to plead theirfraudclaim with sufficient particularity. (R.
at 29-57.) Bustos additionally argued the claims against him were barred because he had
no agency relationship with the Russell Plaintiffs. (R. at 54.)
The district court erred in dismissing the Russell Plaintiffs' claims for four
reasons. First, the Carson Defendants concealed their wrongful conduct, tolling the
applicable statutes of limitation until Russell/Packard and Russell first learned in the
Spring of 2000 that CMT was not affiliated with Saratoga, which put them on notice to
conduct further inquiry into the Carson Defendants5 actions. It was not until over one
year later that the Russell Plaintiffs had sufficient facts to support their claims. Because
theyfiledtheir complaint in November of 2001, they were well within the applicable
limitations periods for each claim. Second, the facts as pled establish the Russell
10

Plaintiffs acquired from PRP all right, title and interest in the Saratoga Lots, the sale of
which forms the basis for Plaintiffs' claims, making the Russell Plaintiffs the only ones
with standing to pursue those claims. Third, the complaint contained sufficient facts to
assert a claim for fraud and any issue about the facts involved factual determinations that
should have been developed through discovery and decided by a trier of fact. Finally, no
agency relationship between the Russell Plaintiffs and Bustos was necessary to establish
the claims against him.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RUSSELL
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION.

The Carson Defendants argued seven of the Russell Plaintiffs5 eight claims are
barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.1 Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) sets the
limitations period for the following claims the Russell Plaintiffs asserted below: breach
offiduciaryduty, civil conspiracy to defraud and to breach duties, unjust enrichment,
breach of principal-agency relationship and intentional interference with prospective
economic relations (collectively referred to as the "four-year claims"). It requires they be

1

Bustos failed in his opening and reply memoranda to argue or present any facts
whatsoever demonstrating the discovery rule should not apply. (R. at 92-98.) Carson did
not explain in his opening memorandum why the discovery rule did not apply to all
claims but addressed the issue in his reply memorandum. (R. at 31-50,103-109.)
Thomas simply joined in the arguments made in Bustos' and Carson's memoranda. (R. at
124.)
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brought within four years of the date the cause of action accrues. Utah Code Ann. § 7812-26(4) sets the limitations period for commercial bribery claims at three years. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-26 sets for the limitations period for claims involvingfraudat three
years as well. It additionally contains an internal discovery requirement, stating, "[T]he
cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of
the facts constituting the fraud " Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-26(3). Each of these
periods were tolled by the "discovery rule," making the Russell Plaintiffs' claims timely
and the district court's dismissal for failure to comply with the statutes of limitation
erroneous.
"Under the discovery rule, 'the limitations period does not begin to run until the
discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.'" Berenda v. Langford, 914
P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996) (quoting O'Neal v. Div. ofFamily Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1143
(Utah 1991) (internal quotation marks and additional citation omitted). The discovery
rule applies in three circumstances:
"(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in
situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action
because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in
situations where die case presents exceptional circumstances and the
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of
any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of
action."
Spears v. Wan, 2002 UT 24 at \ 33,44 P.3d 742 (quoting Warren v. Provo City Corp.,
838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)). While the applicability of a statute of limitations and
12

discovery rule are questions of law, "the applicability of the statute of limitations and the
discovery rule also involves a subsidiary factual determination-the point at which a
person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a
question of fact." Id. at \ 32 (citing Sevy v. Sec. Title Co. ofS. Utah, 902 P.2d 629,634
(Utah 1995); Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993)) (emphases added).
The Russell Plaintiffs pled, and there is no dispute, that the PRP Contract was
executed on November 8,1996. There is also no dispute the Russell Plaintiffs filed their
Complaint and Jury Demand on November 30,2001. Therefore, absent tolling by the
discovery rule, the statute of limitations expired on the commercial bribery and fraud
claims on November 7, 1999 and on the remaining four-year claims on November 7,
2000.
The Russell Plaintiffs also affirmatively pled, however, facts supporting the
application of the discovery rule, thereby tolling the applicable statutes of limitation until
the Spring of 2000. They alleged as follows:
At the time the CMT contract, signed on November 4,1996, and the
PRP contract, signed on November 8,1996, were executed, Carson, Bustos,
and Thomas set on a course of conduct through agreement to conceal from
plaintiffs and Saratoga CMT's relationship to the defendants and CMT's
lack of relationship to the plaintiffs and Saratoga.
[]This concealment was a necessary part of the scheme and device to
permit the CMT contract to be signed by Saratoga on November 4,1996,
and to "flip the sale" to PRP on November 8,1996.
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[]This intentional concealment and failure to disclose to plaintiffs the
fact that CMT was not owned by or controlled through Saratoga or, as to
Saratoga, CMT was not owned by or in the control of plaintiffs, plaintiffs
and Saratoga would not have permitted the flip purchase and sale through
CMT while Carson and Thomas were acting as agents andfiduciariesof
plaintiffs or to benefit Bustos.
[JPlaintiffs did not discover that CMT was not the agent for, under
the control of, owned by, or otherwise acting for, Saratoga, in connection
with the sale of the lots, until spring of 2000, when an accountant working
for Saratoga discovered the possibility of a flip sale and purchase, which
prompted discussions between Russell on the one hand, and a representative
of Saratoga on the other hand.
[]At all times previous to that, defendants formulated a scheme in
which plaintiffs were introduced to Saratoga by the defendants and always
referred to as the builder or buyer, and Saratoga's representatives were
introduced to plaintiffs by the defendants and always referred to as the
seller or developer.
[]On information and belief, in the spring of 2000, an accountant for
Saratoga questioned the ownership or control status of CMT, in connection
with the "take down" or closing of the last twelve of the lots.
[JSaratoga, on information and belief, was then placed on inquiry
notice that CMT may not have been the agent or under the control of
plaintiffs and, after discussions with Saratoga's representatives in the spring
of 2000, plaintiffs werefirstplaced on inquiry notice of CMT's control
status as well.
[]This affirmative conduct and concealment of the defendants
constituted a pattern during October and November 1996 during the sale
and continued thereafter through spring of 2000 that CMT was known only
to plaintiffs as Saratoga's agent or company owned by or under the control
of Saratoga. The active concealment continued until spring of 2000 by the
defendants.
[]After the conversation with Saratoga's representative concerning
CMT's actual status, further inquiry and investigation were made by
14

plaintiffs concerning the ownership and control of CMT and the
circumstances of the two contracts signed in November 1996 by plaintiffs
and Saratoga.
(R. at 80-82ffif52-62.) The Russell Plaintiffs additionally explained in depth their
memorandum opposing the motions to dismiss how these facts operated to toll the
applicable statutes of limitation. (R. at 53-55,64-68.)
Two of the three circumstances necessary to apply the discovery rule are present in
this case: 1) discovery of the wrong is mandated by statute for thefraudclaim; and 2) the
Carson Defendants actively concealed their wrongful conduct for all claims, including the
claim for fraud. The Russell Defendants pled they first learned CMT was not affiliated
with Saratoga in the Spring of 2000. Because the PRP Contract was signed on November
8,1996, the three-year limitations period for thefraudclaim expired on November 7,
1999, which was before the Russell Plaintiffs were even put on notice to inquire further
into the transaction. Under the discovery provision mandated by the statute of limitations
governing fraud claims, the district court should have applied the discovery rule to the
Russell Plaintiffs' fraud claim and denied the motions to dismiss.
The concealment prong of the discovery rule also applies in this case, not only to
the remaining claims, but to thefraudclaim as well. The concealment prong provides
that where a plaintiff does not become aware of a cause of action because of a defendant's
concealment or misleading conduct, the statute of limitations is tolled '"until the
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discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action."5 Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16
at \ 15,28 P.3d 1271 (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)).
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed thefraudulentconcealment prong of the
discovery rule recently in Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16,28 P.3d 1271. The court in Hill
explained the general test applied in determining whether a limitations statute should be
tolled based on concealment. It stated:
Fraudulent concealment under the discovery rule requires determining (i)
when a plaintiff would reasonably be on notice to inquire into a defendant's
bad acts despite defendant's attempts to hide those acts; and (ii) whether a
plaintiff, once on notice, reasonably would have discovered, with due
diligence, the facts on which the cause of action is based despite the
defendant's efforts to hide those facts.
Id at 1f 18 (citing Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 52 (Utah 1996)).
The Carson Defendants argued, and the district court held, the discovery rule did
not apply to any of the Russell Plaintiffs' claims because they admitted in their amended
complaint they discovered in the Spring of 2000 that CMT was not affiliated with
Saratoga. Therefore, the court concluded, the Russell Plaintiffs had knowledge of their
potential claims before expiration of the limitations period, giving rise to a duty to file
those claims before expiration of the limitations period. (R. at 103-105.) The district
court's ruling was erroneous.
The Russell Plaintiffs pled concealment by the Carson Defendants in detail. While
the Russell Plaintiffs learned for thefirsttime in the Spring of 2000 that CMT was not
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associated with Saratoga, which was approximately five months prior to the expiration of
the four-year limitations periods, and after the expiration of the three-year periods, they
did not discover actual facts forming the basis for their causes of action until after the
November 7,2001 deadline. The inability to find a link in the Spring of 2000 was not
proof the Carson Defendants had wronged the Russell Defendants. It merely alerted the
Russell Plaintiffs that something might be wrong and gave rise to a duty by them to
further investigate the true nature of the transactions. It was not until they conducted
further inquiry and investigation, and past all relevant statutes of limitation, that the
Russell Plaintiffs learned the true nature of the scheme and that the statutes began to run.
The Russell Plaintiffs filed their claims within the statutes once the discovery rule is
applied.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar distinction between discovering one
may have been wronged and learning facts forming the basis for a cause of action in Hill,
2001 UT 16, 28 P.3d 1271. There, the plaintiffs agents gave the defendants $1.54
million to purchase a ranch. The plaintiff did not learn of the transfer until February 1990
when the agents informed her the defendants had absconded with her money. The
plaintiff met with the defendants in March 1990. They told her they did not have her
money. Id. atfflf3-6. She, therefore, hired a private investigator to locate it, which he
was unable to do. Id. at % 7. Four years later and still without her money, the plaintiff
hired two new investigators. In December of 1994, two of the defendants admitted to the
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investigators that another defendant had fled with her money. Id. atfflj8-9. The plaintiff
did not learn of these facts until July 1995. Id.
The plaintiff filed her complaint in August 1997 asserting claims for, among other
things,fraud,unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy. Id. at \ 11. The defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment arguing the statute of limitations barred her claims because
the facts supporting them occurred in late 1989. Id. at ^ 13. The plaintiff opposed the
motion on the ground the discovery rule tolled the limitations period. The trial court
disagreed and granted the motion. The plaintiff appealed. Id. at f 1.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed summary judgment and remanded the case for
trial. Id. It ruled the defendants' active concealment of facts giving rise to plaintiffs5
claims tolled the statute of limitations until July 1995, when plaintiff first learned of the
facts giving rise to her claims and discovered the identities of the defendants. Id. at ^J19.
It explained that operation of the discovery rule "prevents the limitations period from
beginning to run until the facts forming the foundation for the cause of action are
discovered." Id. at \ 15 (citing Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Utah 1998)).
Like the plaintiff in Hill, the Russell Plaintiffs may have been put on notice they
may have been wronged prior to expiration of the statute of limitations, but did not learn
"facts forming the foundation for the cause of action" until after expiration of the
limitations period due to the necessity of conducting an investigation into what happened.
Id. at f 15. As in Hill, the district court should have applied the discovery rule based on
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concealment by the Carson Defendants, thereby tolling the limitations periods until the
Spring of 2000, making the Russell Plaintiffs' claims timely. Its failure to do so
constitutes reversible error.
The Carson Defendants additionally argued no concealment actually occurred
because Russell/Packard had reasonable notice PRP was not purchasing the Saratoga Lots
directly from Saratoga at the time of the first closing, which occurred sometime in 1997,
from the closing documents which showed CMT was the owner. (R. at 105-109). The
Russell Plaintiffs, however, explained why these documents did not impart reasonable
notice to them of CMT's actual part in the scheme. It is common for developers and
builders to create special entities to with different names to "own" a project. Therefore,
the fact CMT was named as the seller in the closing documents does not give notice to a
reasonable person or even a reasonable developer or builder that CMT was not affiliated
with Saratoga. (R. at 207 at pg. 28.) The fact that Saratoga also did not learn CMT was
not associated with PRP until the Spring of 2000 further supports the Russell Plaintiffs'
argument that the closing documents by themselves, as alleged by the Carson Defendants,
did not impart reasonable notice of CMT's position. The Utah Supreme Court ruled in
Hill that once there is an allegation:
a defendant has concealed a plaintiffs cause of action, the questions of
when a plaintiff should reasonably begin inquiring about the defendant's
wrongdoing and whether, once on notice, the plaintiff has acted with
reasonable diligence to discover the facts forming the basis of the cause of
action are all highly fact-dependent legal questions
We explicitly
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acknowledge that weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in
light of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause of action necessitates the
type offactualfindings which preclude summary judgment in all but the
clearest of cases.
Id. (citing Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53-54; Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d
1181,1186 (Utah 1989) (stating that in medical malpractice action "close calls" of
whether plaintiffs acted reasonably in failing to discover the cause of action "are for
juries, not judges, to make'5)) (emphases added).
With these facts pled, the district court could not have reached its decision without
weighing whether the Russell Plaintiffs' conduct was reasonable against the Carson
Defendants' efforts to conceal their wrongful conduct. Under the standard enumerated by
the supreme court, the district court acted improperly in dismissing the action and should,
therefore, be reversed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RUSSELL
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR LACK OF STANDING.

The Carson Defendants argued below, and the district court ruled, that the Russell
Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims. There were two bases for this ruling. First,
the Carson Defendants argued, all claims relating to wrongful conduct belong solely to
PRP since PRP was the entity that contracted to purchase the Saratoga Lots. (R. at 3536.) Second, they argued, Russell lacks standing to individually pursue any claims. (R.
at 36.) The district court erred in dismissing the Russell Plaintiffs' claims on this basis
for several reasons.
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First it required a consideration of documents outside the scope of the pleadings,
for which there was no foundation and which are inappropriate on a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. Second, even were it proper to consider the relevant document - the Purchase
and Development Agreement (R. at 39-42), the trial court's determination was clearly
erroneous. The Purchase and Development Agreement states, "PRP agrees to assign to
Russell all of its right, title and interest in the [PRP] Contract

" (Id., emphasis

added.) "[A]H of [PRP's] right, title and interest in the [PRP] Contract" necessarily
includes any claims relating to the purchase of the Saratoga Lots referenced in the PRP
Contract. It is the purchase of those lots and the representations, acts and omissions
associated with it which form the basis of the Russell Plaintiffs' claims against the Carson
Defendants. Moreover, the Purchase and Development Agreement grants the same rights
to Russell individually as to Russell/Packard. Additionally, by virtue of
Russell/Packard's status as partner in PRP, it has standing to assert the claims as pled.
The Carson Defendants also argued, and the district court ruled, the Russell
Plaintiffs were not damaged because PRP purchased each of the Saratoga Lots for
$30,000 and sold them for $38,000. This argument and ruling was erroneous. The
Russell Plaintiffs pled they were damaged because PRP purchased them for $30,000 as
result of the Carson Defendants' wrongful conduct when they were available for
$25,000. PRP's profit was, therefore, cut as the Russell Plaintiffs alleged. Consequently,
the district court should be reversed on is dismissal for lack of standing.
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III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RUSSELL
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR FAILURE ADEQUATELY PLEAD
FRAUD.

The Carson Defendants argued, and the district court ruled, the Russell Plaintiffs
failed to allege any of the Carson Defendants made any misrepresentation directly to
Plaintiffs. The district court used Pace v. Parish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952) as support
for its ruling. Pace states that to prove a claim forfraudulentmisrepresentation, a
plaintiff must prove the following elements:
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew
to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and
was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
Id at 274-75 (citing Stuck v. Delta Land & Water Co., 227 P. 791 (Utah 1924); Jones v.
Pingree, 273 P. 303 (Utah 1928); 23 AM. JUR. 773; 37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 3, p. 215). That is
undeniably the applicable test for pleading fraud. See, e.g., Brown v. Wanlass, 18 P.3d
1137 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) ("To plead fraud with particularity, a plaintiff must allege that
there was 'a false representation of an existing material fact made knowingly or
recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon, and... reasonable reliance
resulting in the plaintiffs injury."') (quoting DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,443 (Utah
1995)). There is nothing, however, in that test that requires the fraudulent
misrepresentation be made directly to a plaintiff. It is sufficient that it is made for the
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purpose of inducing a plaintiff to act and the plaintiff relies on it to its detriment. Pace
v. Parish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952).
Plaintiffs have alleged facts supporting each of the above elements: 1) affirmative
conduct affirming a presently existing fact (R. at 77ffif28-30,35-36,38, 56); 2) falsity
(Id.); 3) knowledge of falsity (Id.); 4) inducement (R. at 78-79 atffif40-44); (5) action in
reliance (R. at 79flf45,47); (6) damages (R. at 83-89 flf 73, 82, 90, 95, 97,103, 111);
(7) detriment (R. at 80 & 38ffif50 & 71); (8) reliance (R. at 79-80ffil42-50); and (9)
reasonableness of reliance (R. at 73, 78, 83ffif3, 5, 37, 71.).
The remaining issues on this claim involved factual determinations that should be
developed through discovery and decided by a trier of fact. Consequently, the district
court should be reversed for dismissing the Russell Plaintiffs5 claims on this basis.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RUSSELL
PLAINTIFFS* CLAIMS FOR LACK OF A FIDUCIARY
RELATIONSHIP.

Bustos additionally argued, and the trial court ruled, he never acted as any type of
agent in PRP's purchase of the underlying Saratoga Lots and that without such a
relationship, he owed the Russell Plaintiffs no duties. The only claims in the Russell
Plaintiffs' complaint that require the existence of such a relationship are for breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of principal agency relationship. Neither of these two claims
are made against Bustos. The remaining claims do not require the existence of an agency
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relationship and there was no proof to the contrary, either factual or caselaw. Therefore,
the district court's order of dismissal on this basis should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Russell Plaintiffs respectfully request that the
Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of their Complaint and remand the case for
further proceedings in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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THE COURT:

Good morning, counsel.

set for hearing on the various motions —

This is the time

or the motions to

dismiss in the matter of Russell Packard Development, et cetera
vs. Carson, case No. C-01854.

Counsel, state your appearances

for the record.
MR. STEPHENS:

Brent Stephens and Heather White for

the plaintiffs, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Very well.

MR. MEADE:

Keith Meade for defendant Joel Carson.

MR. PRATT:

George Pratt and Marci Rectenbaugh for

John Thomas.
MR. ADAMSON:

Craig Adamson and Kevin Jones for

defendant Bustos.
THE COURT:

Very well, counsel.

I've reviewed the

respective pleadings in this matter, and what we will do is
hear first from, I assume, Mr. Meade, your memoranda having
been filed first.

Do you intend to bear the laboring oar in

the argument in this case?
MR. MEADE:

Well, I (inaudible).

THE COURT:

I will then entertain your argument at

this time, Mr. Meade.
MR. MEADE:

You may proceed.

PRP was an entity in which Russell

Packard, the plaintiff and the defendant, Thomas, were members.
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That entity was dissolved in April of 2001 before this action

2

was filed.

3

PRP cannot now make a claim.

In the summer of 1996, which is the relevant time

4

(inaudible) dates (inaudible) there were for Thomas, who was

5

the member of PRP, looked at these lots which are the subject

6

of this —

7

Russell to be the manager of PRP at that time.

8

reasons it was not until November of 1996 after CMT had made

9

the offer to purchase the lots that John Thomas and PRP decided

or give rise to this lawsuit.

He was conceded by
For various

10

to purchase these same lots.

11

point where he was willing to buy them, the lots were already

12

under contract to CMT.

13

By the time Thomas got to the

The important thing here is that Thomas was the

14

manager of PRP, was fully aware of the status of these lots.

15

Carson was a realtor at the time and had acted as a realtor in

16

the sale of the lots from the developer, Saratoga, to the

17

initial purchaser, CMT*.

18

sale, and in fact, Thomas, who was the manager of PRP, was

19

himself a real estate broker.

20

Carson was not a realtor in the second

When the lots were sold the second time, and the

21

plaintiffs have characterized it as a "flip sale," and I don't

22

care what they call it, but when they were sold a second time

23

the purchase price was $30,000.

24

price and Thomas knew that CMT had purchased lots the first

25

time around for $25,000.

Thomas knew that that was the
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Now in April of 1997 Russell and Thomas split the

2

sheets and that agreement was attached to our motion to

3

dismiss.

4

$30,000, but for $38,000 a lot, and he agreed he was taking

5

those lots, and Thomas kept everything else having to do with

6

PRP.

7

At that time Russell purchased the lots, not for

There's two other lawsuits in this court pending

8

involving the same transaction.

9

Springs vs. Carson and Bustos.

10

vs. Carson and Bustos.

11

year 2000.

There is a case, Saratoga
There is another one, Wardley

Those cases have been pending since the

12

THE COURT:

To whom are those cases assigned?

13

MR. MEADE:

One is assigned to Judge Hansen, and one

14

is assigned to Judge Iwasaki.

15

taken in those cases.

16

into a side deal with Saratoga and Wardley agreeing to

17

cooperate with them in* their lawsuit against Wardley and

18

Bustos, and to share in the judgment they got, if any.

19

Larry Russell's has already been

In June of 2000 Larry Russell entered

Larry Russell's deposition was taken in the other

20

suits last winter.

21

based on a theory that CMT never existed and that the first

22

sale was, I guess, a sham is his claim.

23

The plaintiff's claims here are essentially

The plaintiffs have unusually acknowledged in their

24

complaint that they knew of the wrongdoing in the Spring of

25

2000 —

the alleged wrongdoing.

They don't say exactly when,
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but certainly by June of 2000 when they signed the side deal

2

with Wardley and Saratoga they knew of the circumstances.

3

initial complaint was filed in November of 2001, four and a

4

half years after the first closing, which occurred in June or

5

July ~

6

The

July of 1997.
What happened was the contract was for the sale of 72

7

lots, and they were closing in bunches of six.

The first

8

closing didn't occur until July of 1997, which is the date I've

9

got here.

The significance of that is that at that time a deed

10

was recorded from Saratoga Springs to CMT, and then there was

11

actually a second closing where there was a sale from CMT to

12

PRP and another set of recorded deeds there.

13

Part of our argument in our brief is that the

14

recording of those deeds, which were of record and in the chain

15

of Russell's title gives him notice that Saratoga and CMT were,

16

at least on paper, two separate entities and gave him people he

17

could call and talk to" if he had questions about that

18

particular transaction.

19

Now the complaint alleges a number of causes of action

20

against Carson and the other defendants.

Two, four —

five of

21

those causes of action breach of fiduciary duty, civil

22

conspiracy, unjust enrichment, breach of a principal agency

23

relation and intentional interference with prospective economic

24

relations are all based on —

25

of limitations.

or all have a four year statute

There seems to be no disagreement in the
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pleadings that the four-year statute applies to these causes of

2

action.

3

Russell acknowledges in his pleadings that he

4

discovered the wrongdoing in the spring of 2000.

It doesn't

5

really commit —

6

wrongdoing occurred or when it should be measured from, but if

7

we give them the benefit of the doubt and argue that it would

8

start at the first closing, which is July of 1997, which would

9

be the latest possible date they could have knowledge, then the

the plaintiffs don't really commit to when the

10

four year statute of limitations would have run in July of

11

2001.

12

They've argued that the discovery rule applies and

13

that that tolls the statute of limitations, and I guess that

14

the statute ought to start when they discovered the wrongdoing

15

in the spring of 2000.

16

discovery rule —

17

statute of limitations applies under that four-year statute,

18

you'd have the bring the cause of action before the four-year

19

statute runs.

20

As we discussed in our brief, the

if you discover the wrongdoing before the

So in other words, they had to bring their action

21

between the spring of 2000 and July of 2001.

They had over a

22

year to bring their action, and they didn't do it, and the

23

statute of limitations has run.

24

discussed, is the statutes that have an internal discovery rule

25

and those that do not, and that was discussed in the

The difference there, as we've
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BYU/Frandsen case.

2

express discovery rule written in the statute as opposed to a

3

court imposed one where there is an internal discovery rule

4

stated, then the statute starts to run from the date of

5

discovery.

6

In other words, if the statute has an

This statute does not have the internal discovery

7

rules, so the four-year statute ran in July of 2001.

8

those five causes of action, the second, third, fifth, seventh

9

and eighth are all barred by the statute of limitations.

10

So all of

That rule was applied to this very statute that's at

11

issue here by the Utah Supreme Court in the Atwood vs. Sterm

12

case, 823 P.2d 1064, and the facts there are remarkably similar

13

in terms of dates and discovery, and unless we are going to

14

rewrite that opinion, these cases —

15

are barred.

16

or those causes of action

On the fraud claim others are going to address most of

17

that, and we've tried to break this up.

18

emphasize from Carson's point of view is that there is not a

19

single allegation that Carson misrepresented anything to

20

Russell.

21

The thing I want to

There are a number of paragraphs referred to in the

22

plaintiff's reply memorandum containing allegations of

23

misrepresentation, but you can read through each one of

24

those —

25

that indicates that Carson misrepresented anything to Russell.

and I have done it —

and there is nothing in that
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There are allegations that Carson misrepresented things to

2

Saratoga Springs, but Saratoga Springs is already in court and

3

we're already at issue with those, and there's no indication

4

that Russell has any ability to pursue those claims.

5

Carson was not an agent of the second transaction.

6

Russell's deposition at page 73, which he gave in the other

7

case, he expressly indicated that he did not have any contact

8

with Carson prior to these contracts being written.

9

In addition, Thomas knew who CMT was.

Again, Thomas

10

is a manager of PRP.

11

transactions, and so there was no misrepresentation by Carson

12

to PRP, and no contact between Carson and Russell.

13

that's why —

14

standing, which Mr. Pratt, I understand, will address.

15

In

He knew everything about the

Maybe

and the second aspect of this is the lack of

There is another —

there has been other litigation

16

between Mr. Russell and Mr. Thomas in this court, case

17

98098727.

18

matter in paragraph 16 of the complaint Mr. Russell alleged

19

that —

20

attached is that he alleges under that agreement, "Russell

21

agreed to transfer all interests in PRP, and that neither

22

Russell nor Russell Packard would have any interest in PRP or

23

its assets, projects or properties."

24

the other matter against his fellow member.

25

he has given up his right to pursue these kinds of claims.

There's been several lawsuits, actually.

In that

in referring to this agreement of April 1997 that we've

That's his allegation in
So it appears that
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2

Anyway, I'll stop there and let others finish the
fraud argument.

Thank you.

3

THE COURT:

All right.

4

MR. STEPHENS:

Thank you, Mr. Meade.

(inaudible) request for clarification

5

(inaudible).

6

We were not (inaudible) to the deposition which (inaudible).

7

This is a motion to dismiss and not a motion for summary

8

judgment, so as far as the record is concerned, those matters

9

that were referred to on some of the record are not before the

10

There were references extraneous to the motion.

Court.

11

THE COURT:

Well, in that regard, Mr. Stephens, there

12

have been submissions to this Court outside the scope of the

13

pleading.

14

summary judgment motion, and you have certainly stated your

15

position, and that's fine.

Consequently, I am viewing this proceeding as a

16

Mr. Pratt?

17

MR. PRATT:

You've protected your position.

Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. Meade and I

18

may have had a little communication mix-up as we discussed how

19

we might allocate our arguments so as not to be duplicative.

20

was not prepared to argue the standing issue, but I understand

21

that Mr. Adamson will make that argument, and I don't intend to

22

touch that one.

23

I

I would like to come back first just to emphasize the

24

arguments that have been made in the briefs on the motion to

25

dismiss the fraud claim.

Your Honor, when the initial

-11complaint was filed and then the amended complaint filed
afterwards, the defendants had already made the argument that
the fraud claim was fatally deficient for the simple reason
that it failed to allege any representation that was made by
the defendants to the plaintiff.
After having had the opportunity to review that
simple, and I would say fundamental argument about the defect
in the fraud claim when the amended complaint was filed, the
first claim for relief for fraud is identical.

Not one word

was changed, so one must assume that that's the best allegation
that the plaintiffs are able to make on this fraud claim.
One will review the first cause of action, and indeed
the entire complaint, and find absolutely no allegation
anywhere that any of the defendants made any representation to
the plaintiffs.

The only representation —

the fraud claim is

found at page 11 beginning with paragraph 63.

If you look at

paragraph 65, that is the representation that is alleged as
part of this fraud claim, and the representation is that
defendants represented to Saratoga —

not the plaintiffs

—

Saratoga being the seller, not the plaintiff/buyers of this
property.

Defendants represented to Saratoga that CMT was part

of, affiliated with or owned by plaintiffs.
No allegation that any representation was made by
plaintiffs that plaintiffs relied on as a basis for doing
anything that's alleged in the complaint.
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If you look then at paragraph 71, construing the

2

pleading liberally, given every benefit to the doubt —

3

of the doubt to the plaintiffs in the way this has been

4

pleaded, paragraph 71 says, "The plaintiffs reasonably relied

5

upon the acts and conduct of defendants to plaintiff's

6

detriment and damage,"

7

that they relied on any representation that was made by

8

plaintiffs.

9

unspecified —

Even there still, they're not alleging

They're just saying that they relied on
really anywhere in the whole pleading —

10

and conduct.

11

any representation.

12

THE COURT:

13

acts

They don't allege that they reasonably relied on

You're referring to representation

allegedly made by the defendants rather than the plaintiffs.

14

MR. PRATT:

Correct.

15

THE COURT:

The plaintiffs presumably failed to

16

allege, in your judgment, sufficient statements in the

17

complaint to the effect that they have relied on

18

misrepresentation made by the defendants.

19

MR. PRATT:

To the plaintiffs.

20

THE COURT:

To the plaintiffs.

21

MR. PRATT:

Correct,

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

benefit

Either I misheard you or I think

you misstated—

24

MR. PRATT:

I probably mis-spoke.

25

THE COURT:

Certainly it is the defendants who are
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present in this case against whom allegations apply are made,

2

MR, PRATT:

Correct,

3

THE COURT:

All right.

4 1

MR. PRATT:

And again, in case I have misspoken, your

5

Honor, the point here is that there is nothing in the

6

complaint, either within the language of the first cause of

7

action or anywhere else in the complaint, where there's an

8

allegation that the defendants made any representation to the

9

plaintiffs.

10

It's just not there.

We don't know what those statements are.

They haven't

11

been alleged.

They've had two opportunities to plead any such

12

statements now, and they're simply not in the pleadings.

13

Again, if you wanted to construe the pleading

14

liberally, looking at paragraph 71, that's the closest you can

15

even conceptually get to the proposition that maybe there is

16

some allegation of what the defendant said to the plaintiffs.

17

All they say is that they relied on acts and conduct of

18

defendants, not on any statements.

19

the complaint that are alleged that were made to the

20

plaintiffs.

21

There are no statements in

Again, I'm getting a little bit theoretical here, but

22

assuming that you might say that this unspecified acts and

23

conduct were somehow the representation that's necessary to be

24

made to the plaintiffs to constitute an element of their cause

25

of action, we don't know what the acts or the conduct is.
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Under Rule 9(b), this is the type of thing in a fraud

2

claim that is supposed to be stated with particularity.

3

pleading should state exactly what it was that was stated to

4

the plaintiffs, when it was said, the circumstances and so

5

forth, and that just simply is not to be found in the

6

complaint.

7

The

There's been two opportunities to plead that, and I

8

think we must assume, because number one, the plaintiffs'

9

counsel are experienced lawyer, and because they've had two

10

opportunities to plead this that there simply is not a Rule 11

11

basis to plead any representation that was made by the

12

defendants to the plaintiffs that they relied on.

13

not in the pleading.

14

It's just

I'd like to just address briefly the statute of

15

limitations argument, your Honor, and this has been briefed and

16

Mr. Meade has already addressed it, but I wanted to again draw

17

the Court's attention to the Atwood against Sterm Ruger and

18

Company case, which as Mr. Meade mentioned, is strikingly

19

similar to the case before this Court.

20

One of the things I love about this case is it's only

21

about a page long, and yet the dispositive facts and the

22

holding are very, very clear.

23

In this case the plaintiff was injured by a gun

24

manufactured by the defendant in an accident that didn't

25

involve anyone but the plaintiff.

The gun went off and hurt
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him.

2

Some time later he went in to see a lawyer and said,

3

"You know, I — " the lawyer told him that he may have a basis to

4

file a suit here because I've read some things about this

5

particular gun —

6

there may be some negligence in the manufacture of this

7

particular gun that hurt you.

8
9

the lawyer happened to know about guns, and

After that, the lawsuit got filed —
happened —

and that

that information came to the plaintiff's attention

10

that he may have the basis to file a lawsuit, knew all of the

11

facts necessary to inform him that a lawsuit was available to

12

him —

13

the spring of 1988, but he didn't file his lawsuit until four

14

years and two days after the injury had occurred.

15

a claim against the defendant.

He learned of that in

So he made the argument, which is the exact same

16

argument —

in other words, it was time barred unless he gets

17

the benefit of some type of tolling because it was a four year

18

statute of limitations, clearly measured from the date of the

19

injury.

20

he should get the benefit of the discovery rule that's been

21

talked about in a lot of the Utah cases, and that the statute

22

of limitations should not begin to run at all until the time he

23

learned about the injury, which was about five or six months

24

coincidentally, just about the same time period that's

25

applicable here, and I'll get to that in a moment —

He argued just as the defendants are arguing here that

five or

—
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2

six months before the four-year statute would run.
Unfortunately, the plaintiff had waited until four

3

years and two days until the lawsuit was filed, and so he

4

argued that under the discovery rule, the statute of

5

limitations should not begin to run until three and a half

6

years, approximately, after the injury occurred but when he

7

first became aware that he had the basis to file a lawsuit.

8

The Court said no, under these circumstances, because

9

he learned of the existence of the cause of action five or six

10

months before that four-year statute would have run, you don't

11

get the benefit of afty discovery rule when you learn of the

12

existence of the cause of action before the statute of

13

limitations runs.

14

within that four year statute of limitations.

15

Listen to the language of the Court.

You've got the obligation to file your claim

It's very, very

16

clear on page 1065, and it's 823 P.2d, a 1992 case.

17

discovery rule has often been applied to give a plaintiff the

18

opportunity to file his action after learning of certain

19

critical facts, the discovery rule has no application here.

20

held in Briqham Young University v. Falsom Construction—" one

21

of the cases mentioned by Mr. Meade —

22

does not apply to a plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries

23

or damages and a possible cause of action before the statute of

24

limitations expires."

25

"While the

We

"that the discovery rule

Then the Court says, "Plaintiff concedes that he
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learned of a potential legal cause of action in the spring of

2

1988," which is when he talked to the lawyer who said, "You

3

know, you may have a lawsuit here," "which would be several

4

months before the expiration of the statute of limitations.

5

does not suggest any reason why the action could not have been

6

filed between the spring of 1988 and October 11th of that

7

year," which would have been the four years from the time of

8

the injury had taken place.

9

So if you apply that holding —

He

and that is the law in

10

the State of Utah —

11

to plaintiff's complaint, was in November 1996 when this

12

alleged flip-sale purchase took place, and the defendants

13

allegedly skimmed this $5,000 piece out of the purchase price.

14

to our facts here, the injury, according

What the plaintiffs now allege in their amended

15

complaint very explicitly, your Honor, is that they became

16

aware, coincidentally, in the spring of the year 2000 that

17

there was wrongdoing in connection, according to them, with

18

this transaction that occurred in November of 1996.

19

Well, that was the spring of 2000.

They still have

20

five or six months before the four-year statute that's

21

applicable to virtually all the claims at issue in this case

22

would run.

23

absolutely crystal clear that plaintiffs have the obligation

24

because they discovered the existence of the cause of action

25

long before the running of the four year statute of

Under reasoning of the Atwood case, it's just

-18limitations, which would have been in November 2000.

They had

from the spring to November to file this complaint, but they
didn't do it until November of 2001.
They get absolutely no benefit under the Atwood case
or the Brigham Young University case, other cases that have
been cited by Mr. Meade in his memorandum, of the discovery
rule here because they discovered the existence of the cause of
action five, six, maybe seven months, depending on exactly what
is meant by the spring, as alleged in their amended complaint.
They discovered it that much before the time the four-year
statute runs.

The case law is absolutely clear they get no

benefit of any tolling.

They were bound to that four year

statute of limitations.

That's why all of the claims based on

the four year statute of limitations are time barred.

That's

all I have, your Honor.
THE COURTS

All right.

Mr. Pratt, thank you.

Mr. Adamson?
MR. ADAMSON:

May it please the Court, counsel, I

don't propose to reargue what Mr. Meade and Mr. Pratt have
argued, your Honor, but only to indicate to you the difference.
There are two things.

One is the difference between Mr. Bustos

and everybody else in this case.
Mr. Bustos is a real estate agent, and he —

and the

allegations against Mr. Bustos are one step further removed
than everybody else.

He made no representations, he's claimed

18
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to have no duty to make any representations, or no duty to any

2

of these people on the plaintiff's side.

3

of some fairly indistinct claim of conspiracy resulting from

4

the fact that in the end he got some of the money.

5

He had no part in the sales, no part in the

6

transactions whatsoever.

7

It is alleged here that he had —

8

and forth between him and Mr. Thomas.

9

He is in this because

He had no dealings whatever with PRP.
that there was a debt back

In the cases before Judge Iwasaki and Judge Hansen the

10

evidence is different than that, but —

11

acknowledgement that there are debts owed, but that they become

12

owed at a later time.

13

I think the —

and there is an

but on the state of the pleadings here,

14

that is the extent of the claims against Bustos, that he's

15

entered into some conspiracy, that he ended up with money, and

16

that somehow Thomas owed him money and he is therefore a

17

defendant in this action.

18

The fact of the matter is that the claims here should

19

be time barred simply because A) of the internal —

20

statute of limitations.

21

in my mind, even more difficult to sustain because they are all

22

claims where what —

23

person acting under the information that was available to them

24

have gotten notice.

25

or the

The three-year claims are even more,

where the test is, when would a reasonable

Well, the first time they would have gotten notice was
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when the deeds were recorded.

2

they knew from that moment that somebody existed.

3

have asked questions, and a reasonable person who was involved

4

in this transaction simply would have done so.

5

They had bought from somebody,
They could

To pass that and to go on to where I really was

6

coming from for this argument, your Honor, if you will go to

7

Mr. Meade's original motion, you will see attached to it the

8

contract under which PRP separated from the plaintiffs in this

9

action.

10
11

The paragraphs that have something to do with why we

are here today are paragraphs two and three.
Premier Homes LC really is not someone or an entity

12

that any of the defendants had anything to do with.

13

worked for PRP, if they had anything to do with it at all.

14

They all

Now of course, that's somewhat untrue of Mr. Russell,

15

because he was part of PRP.

16

at least, Bustos and Carson had, if anything to do at all, they

17

had to do with a company called PRP.

18

With respect to Bustos and Carson,

PRP was later split, and under this contract the

19

parties split the assets between them.

If you look at

20

paragraph two the remaining entity, PRP, which is the only one

21

that ever had any dealings with the lots in question here up to

22

that time, agrees to assign to Russell, who is the plaintiff

23

here, all of its right, title and interest in the contract and

24

its right to acquire the Saratoga Springs property at the time

25

of closing.

That's what we're talking about in this case, that

-211
2

very contract.
PRP from that moment goes on.

3

Russell goes on and he has now sold —

4

from PRP the right to buy those lots.

5

That's Russell..
or he has now purchased

Now if you look at paragraph three, what did Russell

6

not purchase?

He disclaims any interest as a material part of

7

the consideration of this agreement, Russell and RPI

8

acknowledge and agree that upon the consummation of the

9

transaction set forth in this agreement, neither Russell nor

10

RPI shall have any further interest in and to PRP or any of its

11

assets, projects or properties.

12

If the right to file this claim exists at all, it

13

exists in the company that had the contract in the beginning.

14

That contract carried with it —

15

everything that Russell now has.

16

company the asset that I've just described to you, and he gave

17

up the remaining assets.

18

buy the lots, and he left with the entity that he was leaving

19

all other assets.

20

those dealings carried with it
Russell purchased from the

In clear terms he bought the right to

I don't see how it can be read that Russell can claim

21

that he has any more right to any asset, other than the right

22

to buy the lots, as contracted for, period.

23

If they had wanted to do that they would have had to

24

describe causes of actions, things like that.

25

action that existed at the time.

This is cause of

Either it was not described
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and left for the remaining assets, which are clearly described.

2

Everything else other than the right to buy these lots stays

3

with the company.

4

stretched to read that causes of action that go with the

5

contract are included.

6

buy are the assets that Russell purchased.

7

stayed with the corporation —

8

LLC, and that entity has not chosen to bring this action.

9

fact, Russell now wants —

I can't see any way that the language can be

The contract itself and the right to
The remainder

or the entity —

it's really an
In

what the meaning of this action is

10

that Russell wants to go back and sue the people that he

11

contracted with to get back some of what he did not retain, and

12

the Court should not go so far.

13

to sue in this case.

14

THE COURT:

All right.

They have simply no standing

Thank you, Mr. Adamson.

Let

15

me interrupt for a moment, Mr. Stephens, before I hear from

16

your side of the issue.

17

to report?

Folks, do you have something you wish

18

(Court handles other matter)

19

THE COURT:

20

Russell Packard Development.

Let's now return to the instant matter,

21

Mr. Stephens, I'll entertain your comments now.

22

MR. STEPHENS:

Thank you, your Honor.

Let me first

23

start out as to the procedural context that I want to make

24

clear to the Court as to what my position is.

25

most importantly I want to tell you or the Court what I have,

Secondly and
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and I want to be candid, because if the Court does not think

2

that I have what is, I think, a common law garden variety fraud

3

in the classic sense case, then I don't want to go any further.

4

As to the procedural context, I do believe that it has

5

to be considered most appropriately under the motion to dismiss

6

standards.

7

There was a code section, there was an agreement, and there was

8

some warranty deeds.

9

case.

There were attachments made to Meade's affidavit.

They're irrelevant to my theory of the

They're not in affidavit form, but I don't think it

10

matters.

11

motion to dismiss, and we have so treated it as a motion to

12

dismiss because we filed the first amendment complaint without

13

leave of court.

14

I think that the defendants have treated it as a

So the only thing that would be extraneous to the

15

pleading is that would make it a motion for summary judgment

16

are matters of public record or statutes or are irrelevant and

17

immaterial at this juncture as far as the motions to dismiss

18

are concerned.

19

Court look at it from a motion to dismiss standard, because if

20

I'm going to lose, I want to lose on the right standard.

21

motion for summary judgment would have been handled differently

22

by me, and I'm sure by the defendants.

23

So I do think that it's important that the

A

With respect to those other proceedings, we were not

24

parties to those proceedings, except the one claim against our

25

own partner, which has nothing to do with this case.

So this
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is a separate case standing on its own legs separate and apart

2

from what Wardley is doing or anything else.

3

should stand or fall as to the case itself, and that would

4

mean, based upon my procedural context, based upon what I have

5

pleaded as to well pleaded facts in the first amended

6

complaint.

7

I'll —

So this case

the second part is what I want to do is tell

8

the Court and the parties what I have, and if I don't have it,

9

tell me.

If I do have it —

and I think I do have it, then I'm

10

entitled to proceed, because what I view this case as is not a

11

derivative or a hybrid type of case.

12

fraud.

13

It sounds in common law

There are claims of breaches of fiduciary duties

14

because of the parties' relationships.

15

to be a fraud-fraud type of case.

16

think that it has to be accepted for the purposes of this case

17

is true, is this fact,, and that is the people that I represent,

18

Packard Russell and Mr. Russell were California real estate

19

developers, particularly Russell, and he comes into Utah in

20

1996 and wants to develop property in Utah.

21

I have what I consider

What I have pleaded, and I

So in order to do that, and knowing that he has to be

22

familiar with the Utah climate, he affiliates with John Thomas,

23

one of the defendants, who has experience in the real estate

24

area.

25

to start looking at business opportunities in Utah to develop

Thomas and Packard form an entity known as PRP in 1996
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property.

2

That brings us to 1996, fall of 1996 where that entity

3

called PRP looks at 72 lots at Saratoga Springs, and Thomas is

4

the leg person for Russell.

5

Thomas is actively pursuing it (inaudible) the managing partner

6

of the LC.

7

Russell is back in California;

Thomas sees the 72 lots and then tells Russell about

8

the 72 lots, and this is all contained in the pleadings, and

9

then Russell becomes interested in the 72 lots, does design

10

work based upon his outside consultants for this, and the

11

design work is very important because it's the first phase of

12

Saratoga Springs.

13

density housing, and the Saratoga Springs developer, which is

14

Wardley or Saratoga Springs Development, I guess it was called,

15

owned in part by Wardley, wants to have (inaudible).

16

It's not —

it's multi —

or it's high

So they liked the plans that are presented by Russell

17

through Thomas, and they are sold on it.

18

people compete about the 72 lots, since they were in the

19

since they were in the beginning portion of the development;

20

they wanted it to look good.

21

the seller plat developer and the actual building developer

22

become interested in each other in 1996.

23

They had several

So we go and the develop —

—

or

So the agent for the plat developer or seller, either

24

for Saratoga Springs or for Wardley —

25

Carrey —

and we hire —

a guy by the name of Dan

and that is Thomas, our fiduciary co-

-26manager —

hires Carson, another defendant, who becomes our

real estate agent•
So we have Thomas as fiduciary and agent for PRP, and
we have now Carson as agent, and assuming that agents have
duties that are akin to fiduciary relationships, Carson now
owns duties of that type to PRP.
Bustos comes in and Thomas owes Bustos, who is also a
Wardley real estate agent, significant sums of money based upon
information, I believe, when we doing a lot of due diligence in
the 2000-2001 time period to determine that.
Thomas and Bustos' relationship go way back, and
Thomas owes Bustos what we understand to be, or (inaudible)
understand to be significant sums of money.

Carson, of course,

knows Bustos because Bustos and Carson are co-agents in the
Wardley organization.
So Russell and Russell Packard, who is now part of the
PRP entity, doing most of their work in California, likes the
idea, Saratoga Springs likes the idea, and so Russell tells
Carson —

or rather Thomas —

with Saratoga.

to proceed with the deal in 1996

In fact, Carson and Thomas, it is alleged,

introduce Russell one-on-one with Wardwell, the person, because
apparently realtors and developers like to meet people face-toface.

They do a lot of stuff and they like to stare the seller

into the eye and buyer into the eye, and they're always —
they have several meetings.

and

They're always introduced by

26

-271

Carson and Thomas as Saratoga or Wardwell as a seller or the

2

plat developer, and they always introduce Russell as the

3

builder or the contractor or the buyer•

4 I

So we have face-to-face meetings between Wardwell on

5

the one hand and Russell on the other hand, and Wardwell likes

6

Russell's plans—

7
8

THE COURT:

When you say Wardwell, are you referring

to Wardley?

9

MR. STEPHENS:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. STEPHENS:

Wardley, I'm sorry.

Wardley, okay.
Wardley, not Wardwell.

Wardley, who

12

was a broker/principal for Wardley real estate, but actually

13

met Mr. Wardley personally.

14

introduced by Carson and Thomas.

15

October/November the principal, Russell, tells Thomas to run

16

with it.

17

So they're meeting face-to-face,
They like the deal and so in

Let's get it tied up and let's go.
Now in the interim, say in late October, Thomas,

18

Carson and Bustos figure out a scheme where they can make an

19

easy 5K a plot or plat times 72, and they use their connections

20

with Carrey, who was Wardley's agent.

21

Thomas as Russell's agents, and Carrey agrees to sell to

22

Russell each lot for 25K per lot in 1996.

23

Carrey knows Carson and

Carrey and Wardley both think that they're dealing

24

with Russell.

Russell thinks that he's dealing with Wardley

25

and Saratoga.

So Saratoga and Carson and Thomas enter into a

-28purchase and sale agreement — one of the real estate contracts
that's a form contract.

They enter into it, and the entity

that they sell it to is Saratoga to CMT.

That occurs on

November 4, and on November 8 Russell thinks he closes the deal
by tying it up through the real estate contract by buying them
for 30K a lot times 72.
Both think — that is Wardley thinks and Russell
thinks that CMT are each other's agents. This is not uncommon.
Very often developers and builders always try to —

in fact,

they often create special entities to buy large plats because
number one, they like the secrecy, and number two, they don't
want anybody to know who's buying it.

So it's not uncommon

that there would be a different name, such as CMT, on the lot.
That's not the claim of the fraud, and that, we claim, would
not give notice to anybody that CMT does not belong to Saratoga
or is not an agent of Saratoga vis-a-vis Russell and vice
versa.
So CMT as an entity means nothing to us.

It's the

meetings and the face-to-face through Carson and Thomas
facilitated that they're constantly dealing or bringing Wardley
and Russell together saying, "Here's the builder, here's the
seller, let's see if we can't do something about the property.
We'll do something with the property."
close it."
it."

They close it.

Russell says, "Let's

Saratoga tells Carrey, "Let's close

They close it.

28
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Thomas, Russell and Bustos put in the straw entity,

2

CMT, all by their lonesomes in 1996 unbeknownst to Saratoga,

3

unbeknownst to Wardley, and unbeknownst to Russell,

It's a

4 I straw, fictitious, sham instrumentality use to basically steal
5

from Wardley and Russell $5,000 times 72.

6

CMT from the seller on November 4, and the precise terms are

7

closed vis-a-vis Russell on November 8, 1996 at $30,000.

8
9

Because it closes to

There's no reason to flip the sale by fiduciaries
unless there's a fraud, and there's a fraud committed by

10

statements because Thomas and Carson are constantly introducing

11

Wardley and Russell as seller, buyer, developer, plat

12

developer.

13

So we have a fraud committed in 1996.

Bustos is

14

behind it because —

15

forming CMT, and he also gets most of the money out of the

16

deal.

17

commit the fraud and introduce the thing.

18

we know that because he's instrumental in

So he becomes part of the principal for the agents who

So I think there's no doubt that we have a quote,

19

"fraud," quote in 1996 as to both Saratoga and Wardley on the

20

one hand, and somebody on the other hand as buyer, and that

21

brings us to the points of the motion to dismiss, and that is,

22

okay, if we have a fraud in 1996, and I sue everybody in 2001,

23

why aren't I barred?

24

fraud, facially, and I'm outside of the statute —

25

statute on fiduciary duty.

Because I'm outside of the statute on
four-year

-30So that's the first question is that we have a fraud
in 1996, I do sue November 30, 2001, and I would be barred by
the statute of limitations, except for the fact that we have
pleaded two specific elements as to both the fraud items and
fiduciary items that we say causes the statute not to run

—

not to run until 2000, based upon two principles.
One, under the fraud statute we have discovery of the
rule, which is stated in the statute itself.

We also have the

fraudulent concealment exception, which is pleaded
specifically.
So I have —

Again, we're dealing with the motion to dismiss.
and the third exception to the running of the

statute of limitations to round it out is special
circumstances, and we don't claim special circumstances, but we
do claim, and we do plead discovery and fraudulent concealment,
which if pled properly, will cause the statute of limitations
not even to begin to run as to those claims until 2000, which
permits me as to answer the fraud claim, to have filed it in
2003, and breach claim in 2004.
These —

the best iteration of how these discovery

rules apply in specific context, that is both the discovery
rule for fraud, which tolls the statute of limitations until
discovery and the statute doesn't begin to run, and the
fraudulent concealment are stated by that great American Juris,
Justice Zimmerman alleged in his own time, but did a very good
job (inaudible).
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He says as follows —

maybe it was Paul's decision.

2

It sounds like Hall.

3

and he says, "Generally—" this is the Utah Supreme Court's

4

latest pronouncement on what they do with fraudulent

5

concealment and discovery.

6

accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to

7

complete cause of action.

8

discovery rule may operate to toll the period of limitations

9

until the discovery of facts forming a basis for the cause of

10
11

I don't know.

It's Beranda 914 P.2d 445,

"Generally a cause of action

However, in certain instances the

action," blah, citing Walker Drug.
It says that in Utah you have to apply this, and they

12

specifically state that for the trial Courts to do this —

13

love this because they're always doing this is they have

14

they're so fact specific that you cannot enunciate very well a

15

general rule when you apply discovery where it is founded by a

16

statute or a fraudulent concealment where it is pleaded.

17

I
—

In fact, it states, "For the reasons described in

18

Pena, we decline to adopt any of the subrules mentioned above."

19

The subrules are (inaudible) so that trial courts can ease

20

their burden and throw people like me out of court.

21

refuse to adopt that.

22

that a plaintiff must make a prima facia showing of the

23

fraudulent concealment, and then demonstrate that, given the

24

defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have

25

discovered his or her claim earlier.

They

"We leave as the law the general rule

-32"The application of this legal rule to any particular
set of facts is necessarily a matter left to trial courts and
finders of fact."

They punt, but they properly (inaudible) on

this one, and that is the Supreme Court.
We have alleged that we have a fraud in 1996, and we
have alleged that we didn't discover it in 2000 until the final
take down of the last 12 lots where someone in Saratoga's
organization is going through the paperwork —
this.

and we plead

He's a controller type, and says to Larry Wardley — is

that his name?
MS. WHITE: Russell.
MR. STEPHENS: Russell Wardley.
MS. WHITE: Russell Lynn Wardley.
MR. STEPHENS: Lynn Wardley, Larry Russell. Russell
is my client and Wardley is the other guy.

This controller

type, whose name I think is mentioned in the complaint, asks
Wardley, "Who's this CMT organization," and Wardley says,
"That's Russell's company."
Anyway, Wardley talks with Russell, and Russell talks
with Wardley, and they each ask each other, "Who is CMT?

Isn't

he yours, isn't he ours?" Wardley says, "Hell, no," and
Russell says, "Hell, no."

So the discovery of the fraud

doesn't occur until the year 2000; discovery commences the
running of the statute.
We've also pled fraudulent concealment because the
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fraudulent concealment is absolutely necessary for Thomas and

2

Carson•

3

Carson actually is the agent who does not only the sale from

4

Saratoga to CMT, he has the guts enough to do the sale from CMT

5

to PRP.

6

as agent for PRP.

7

Thomas continues to work for Russell after the sale.

So he gets two commissions on the sale and continues

So I have now standing —

I have fraud and I have

8

standing —

I have the statute of limitations fixed.

9

other question then becomes standing.

The only

That gets me to the

10

plain pleading contained in the complaint, and that is PRP

11

dissolves shortly thereafter —

12

other reasons, but that we, as we pleaded in the complaint,

13

that as to the splitting of the sheets between Russell on the

14

one hand and Thomas on the other hand as to PRP, Thomas takes

15

certain assets, Russell and his company take certain assets.

16

But as to those 72 lots, those lots and all right, title and

17

interest therein by assignment go to the plaintiffs.

18
19
20

THE COURT:

not for this reason but for

Those—

Now you're referring to the agreement

attached to the motion to dismiss.
MR. STEPHENS:

21

agreement.

22

total assignment as to the —

23

assignment of all right, title and interest, which includes the

24

claim of fraud that's later discovered that goes to Russell.

25

We were —

We were not referring to that

THE COURT:

that was part of it, but there is a
we plead that there is an

So when you're referring to the language,

-34"right, title and interest in," you're not specifically talking
about the paragraph that's pointed out to me in the agreement•
MR. STEPHENS:

I am not specifically, no.

I am

relying, in part, upon that.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. STEPHENS:

Because assignments can occur in many

ways, and assignments can occur by a variety of vehicles, and
assignments can occur in parcels, that is we did get all right,
title and interest to the 72 lots, and also PRP in winding up
has the ability in and of itself to take chose of action.
Since PRP is no longer in existence, the person or the assignee
who takes that parcel and finds later a chose in action or a
claim for relief through the assignee winding up process
pursuant to an opinion by Judge Billings, that winding up, even
of a dissolved corporation, has the ability to prosecute the
claim.
So I think we have it either under a winding up
equitable theory or under an assignment theory, but that has
been pleaded because someone has the —

if we have a claim for

fraud and the statute of limitations hasn't run —
don't think it has —

which I

someone has to have the ability to bring

the claim or the chose in action.

The person that I think is

the appropriate person would be Russell Packard Development and
Lawrence Russell through assignment.
Or alternatively, it could be pleaded if the Court
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were unsure about the right, title and interest language, among

2

other things, it could be Russell Packard Development and

3

Lawrence Russell as the entity in charge of winding up and

4

dissolving the PRP entity for the purposes of the 72 lots.

5

There has to be some entity or some creation of an

6

entity to bring it because the chose in action is not —

7

according the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah court of appeals,

8

if it was a Billings opinion, does not end by the winding up

9

and dissolution of the corporation, but continues o n —

10

THE COURT:

It doesn't end —

and

and I'm not disagreeing

11

with your analysis of the state and the law.

12

simply, though, had to do with is there another freestanding

13

assignment document which would assign from PRP to your clients

14

any causes of action they may have.

15

bear directly upon the standing question.

16

MR. STEPHENS:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. STEPHENS:

My question

That would seem to me to

It would.

And that's why. I'm—
There would be other materials that we

19

could present as to standing.

20

upon the fact that Russell ended up with all right, title and

21

interest to the 72 lots.

22

evidence presented on the issue of standing, or legal theory,

23

for that matter, because we have a winding up theory and a

24

verifying theory.

25

So standing is —

We are relying certainly in part

It would not be the only document or

yeah, I'm relying in part upon that
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document, but I pled assignment.

2

For purposes of the context, I think my standing is good, and I

3

think it will stand up as well.

4 I

So I do have fraud.

Somebody has to plead it.

I think I've got discovery and

5

tolling, and if I've got a problem with assignment, then I

6

better find that out very quickly, but I've got it in the

7

pleading, and I've got it —

8 1
9

and I think I've got it.

So as to the context of fraud I have it, I think.

On

the context of statute of limitations, I've got it, and on

10

standing, which I think the Court is perhaps rightfully

11

skeptical about, I have it, though, pleaded in this context it

12

has to be a fact that is well pleaded and wouldn't be a basis

13

for a motion to dismiss at this juncture anyway.

14

Again, that's my theory of the case.

I think I have

15

it.

It's a motion to dismiss for all factual purposes.

16

treated as a motion to dismiss, and that's my theory of the

17

case.

18

toss me and we'll go someplace else.

19

If I've got it 1 should be able to plead it if I don't,

THE COURT:

All right.

20

entertain responding statements.

21

first.

22

It was

Thank you, Mr. Stephens.

I'll

I guess, Mr. Meade, you

I guess I'm a little concerned about the procedural

23

question that's been raised by Mr. Stephens, that is your

24

motion to dismiss, Mr. Meade, did contain attachments which

25

were beyond the scope of pleadings filed.

If it's a true
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motion to dismiss I must decide the merits of your respective

2

motions on the basis of what was actually pled before me, that

3

is the pleadings (inaudible) the pleadings.

4

If, on the other hand, I'm to consider the attachments

5

that you've submitted, then of course, I'm faced with this

6

dilemma about the summary judgment motion, if indeed I treat it

7

as a summary judgment motion, I guess there may be some

8

distinction in how to respond to it from Mr. Stephen's

9

perspective.

10

MR. STEPHENS:

And just for the record, it would be

11

clear that we've —

12

didn't care about them because they are what they are.

13

not even in affidavit form, but if we're going to be treated as

14

a 56(f) affidavit based upon standing, and the standing issue

15

was such that the only thing I had was that document, which it

16

doesn't say, then I would treat it differently because I would

17

add it —

18

I thought it necessary; but standing, if that's the concern, I

19

would have additional evidence outside the record.

the attachments we thought were —

we
They're

I would do my own affidavits, and also do a 56(f) if

20

THE COURT:

All right.

21

Mr. Meade, go ahead.

22

MR. MEADE:

Well, let me respond to the easiest point

23

first.

On the five causes of action that we've identified

24

are covered by the four-year rule, the Beranda case that

25

Mr. Stephens has talked about addressed a statute 78-12-27, and
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that has an internal discovery rule, which is the

2

distinguishing factor that we addressed, and the Beranda case

3

is not —

4

statute that's before the Court on these other cases.

5

has nothing to do with the statute —

The Supreme Court —

the four-year

and this is exactly what

6

the statute said, by its own terms that statute, which was

7

78-12-27, does not begin to run until the discovery by the

8

agreed party of the facts upon which the liability accrued.

9

That's the language of the statute.

10

That's not a Court imposed

discovery rule.

11

So the Beranda case is not applicable to this

12

circumstance, and the Sterm and Atwood case that both Mr. Pratt

13

and I spoke about is applicable, and those five causes of

14

action are absolutely time barred.

15

That has nothing to do with anything outside of the

16

pleadings, because they have alleged in their complaint that

17

they discovered in the spring of 2000.

18

their complaint that the sale occurred in November of 1996.

19

those causes ought to go.

20

They have alleged in
So

Now on the fraud claim, the three-year statute, the

21

only documents that are —

and all of the documents that we're

22

dealing with were attached to our initial memorandum.

23

it wasn't something we filed in our reply.

24

complaining in Mr. Russell's reply to our motion about these

25

particular documents, and I don't think there's a dispute that

I mean

I didn't hear any

-39these are genuine documents.

Mr. Stephens' point seems to be

that maybe there are documents beyond this assignment, but the
deeds —

they are not certified copies, but they are clearly

copies of recorded instruments, and there was no complaint
about them.

If there had been, I would have filed something to

buttress them.

They are from the first closing in July of

1997.
They clearly reflect the chain of title from Saratoga
to CMT, and then a separate deed from CMT to Russell Packard.
CMT deed is signed by C. Perez as president of CMT Developing.
Our point is that at that juncture, July of 1997, when
this first closing took place, Mr. Russell was on notice that
there were at least two steps in the chain of title from the
developer to him.

If he believed that the developer was his

grantor, he at least had a duty to ask them questions about why
we have two deeds.
There was no -- and the fact that there are two deeds
like this I mean absolutely destroys the myth that there was
some desire to hide something.

These are of record matters,

and it's of record in the chain of title that Russell was
taking.
Our point is that at this point in time, July of 1997,
he's on notice, and the statute runs from that point forward.
He's over a year late in filing the fraud cause of action
because the statute would run three years from the date he

-40should have discovered —
discovered.

as a reasonable person should have

So by July of 2000 his fraud claim is time barred.

On the standing argument, if the Court, you know, is
not inclined to look at this agreement solely on the assignment
issue, there is another aspect of the agreement that doesn't
seem to be in disagreement, and that's the notion that Russell
didn't buy these lots for $30,000 a lot from PRP.
paid $38,000 per lot.

He actually

There's nothing in the pleadings or

otherwise to suggest that the price would have been any
different.
In other words, another element of fraud is injury or
damage.

If he's already agreed to pay far more than what he

claims the $30,000 — or the $25,000 price, I mean I don't see
where there's a damage that follows. So for those reasons, I
think the Court can dismiss all of these causes of action.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, Mr. Meade.

Mr. Pratt, just briefly I'll hear from you.
MR. PRATT:

Your Honor, I think whatever reference

there has been to extraneous materials only potentially impacts
the standing argument.

I believe that the motions to dismiss

on failure to state a fraud claim and on the statute of
limitations can be resolved right out of the pleadings on
12(b)(6), which is the way we had intended to present this, and
I think the way it has been argued, clearly as to those two
arguments.
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First on fraud, your Honor, I challenged anyone in the

2

courtroom to find where there is an allegation in the amended

3

complaint of a representation of any type made to the

4

plaintiffs.

5

Mr. Stephens spoke at some length about the dealings

6

between the parties, but he did not —

as I would have if I was

7

responding to that argument —

8

"Here's where we made that essential allegation to support a

9

fraud claim against the plaintiffs."

pick up the complaint and say,

The reason he didn't do

10

that but spoke about other things is because it simply is not

11

there.

12

anything to the plaintiffs upon which the plaintiffs relied,

13

and therefore the fraud claim just has —• there is no fraud

14

claim that's been stated.

15

There is no allegation here that the defendants said

On the statute of limitations, Mr. Stephens made

16

reference to the Beranda against Langford case, the 1996

17

decision from the Supreme Court, in an effort to demonstrate

18

that this is a highly fact dependant, fact specific area, that

19

there may be some factual determination that would have to be

20

made that would preclude a dismissal of the claims at this

21

time.

22

The language that Mr. Stephens quoted from states the

23

question of when a plaintiff, when there is an allegation that

24

the defendants have fraudulently concealed the existence of a

25

cause of action, when the plaintiff in that scenario should
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become alerted that he has a cause of action and thus there is

2

a discovery of a cause of action is fact specific.

3

The Court says, "When a defendant has concealed a

4

plaintiff's cause of action, the question of when a plaintiff

5

should reasonably begin inquiring about the defendant's

6

wrongdoing and whether once on notice the plaintiff has acted

7

with reasonable diligence to discover the facts forming the

8

basis of the cause of action are all highly fact dependant

9

legal questions."

10

We don't have to get into that question at all, your

11

Honor, because the plaintiff's complaint absolutely

12

unequivocally resolves what otherwise I suppose might have been

13

a fact question that would have to be resolved before this

14

Court.

15

In the amended complaint in a specific portion of the

16

complaint, with the heading, "Concealment of the facts and to

17

discovery by defendants—" I think they mean plaintiffs, if you

18

look at paragraph 55.

19

and this is the essence of the fraud that's being alleged, of

20

the whole scam that's being alleged.

21

discover that CMT was not the agent for, under the control of,

22

owned by or otherwise acting for Saratoga in connection with

23

the sale of the lots until spring of 2000 when an accountant

24

saw some things that alerted him that there was wrongdoing."

25

It says, "Plaintiffs did not discover—"

"Plaintiffs did not

Down at 59 it's stated again, "This affirmative
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conduct in concealment of the defendants constitute a

2

pattern —

3

1996 during the sale, and continued thereafter through spring

4

of 2000 that CMT was not only the plaintiff Saratoga's agent or

5

company, et cetera."

6

continued until spring of 2000 by the defendants."

7

constituted a pattern during October and November

Last sentence, "The active concealment

That's the type of issue that might be fact dependant,

8

but it's not fact dependant here because the plaintiffs have

9

expressly admitted that they were aware of the facts giving

10

rise to this cause of action specifically in the spring of

11

2000, and under the Sterm/Ruger case, and also under the

12

Beranda case —

13

four-year statute would not run from —

14

four years after the alleged fraud took place in November of

15

1996, they had five or six months to bring a claim, and the

16

discovery rule doesn't help them.

this very case —

that means that because the
until November 2000,

17

Right in the Beranda case at page 55, your Honor,

18

quoting the Atwood case that I cited from more extensively

19

before, the Court reiterates, "The discovery rule does not

20

apply to a plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries or

21

damages and a possible cause of action before the statute of

22

limitations expires."

23

Plaintiffs admit in their pleading they became aware

24

of all the facts that support this cause of action in the

25

spring of 2000.

The statute of limitations would not expire

-44for another five or six months. Under both the Atwood case and
the Beranda case, they simply do not meet the tests, and the
statute of limitations bars those claims.
One other thing, your Honor, there is one other motion
pending before the Court.
overlooked.

I did not want that to be

It's a motion that my client, John Thomas,

initially filed going to the commercial bribery claim, the
legal merits of that claim.

We haven't argued that, and I just

wanted to make sure that that motion did not get overlooked at
this hearing.

Ms. Rectenbaugh of our firm would be ready to

handle that.
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to allow that one to stand
on its submissions, counsel.

I've reviewed it.

That's cause

of action No. 4, the commercial bribery issue—
MR. PRATT:

Correct.

THE COURT:

I've seen the memoranda —

the motion and

the memoranda as it relates to that issue.
MR. PRATT:

Fair enough.

THE COURT: You bet.

Thank you, Judge.

Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

Mr. Adamson?
MR. ADAMSON:

Well, I'll try not to belabor this too

much, your Honor, because we've been here quite awhile. With
respect to Bustos, I think it's important to go over what we've
heard here today, and that is there has been no duty alleged.
There has been no claim that he was a fiduciary, and he is not.
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There has been no claim that he had a duty to tell anybody

2

anything in this case because he did not.

3

With respect to the general case, I would only observe

4

with respect to Mr. Stephens' argument about the corporation

5

first —

6

that mistake.

7

is this document, which by the way, they've known about our

8

claim that this was dispositive since January 31st.

9

didn't think that we were going to be arguing from that

or it's a limited liability company, and I keep making
I think what he was trying to say is that there

If they

10

document they've had since January 31st when we filed our

11

pleading, which relied heavily on it, to make some comment or

12

complaint, which hasn't happened, we know of no other document

13

that assigns the claims.

14

I believe this is the only document, and what I think

15

Mr. Stephens is doing is talking about —

16

concepts here.

17

you've got a contract between two people that own parts of a

18

limited liability company.

19

Okay, we've split the sheets or the assets.

20

assets, they've described what the assets are, they've describe

21

what the assets are not.

22

there is.

23

kind of mixing

First of all, if you've got —

in this case

He's calling it split the sheets.
They take the

I believe that's the only document

Now the next thing he does is say that it was later

24

dissolved.

Well, it seems to me if we're going to kind of mix

25

theories here, let's talk about this in terms of a divorce.

We

-46have two parties that are an entity, the marriage. We split
the sheets on this entity, we get a divorce, we no longer have
a legal entity which we're dealing with.

One party got part of

the assets, the other party got the other.

Then the second

party dies.
What he wants to do is claim that he's inherited this
right.

There is no legal basis for the claim that once you've

given up your rights in an entity that if the entity is then
later dissolved you have some right to inherit those things,
because otherwise they just disappear.
appear.

Sometimes they just

He has no right to do that.
As far as the fraud in this case goes —

claim in any case —

the entire

listen to what Mr. Stephens himself told

you. While we were closing out this thing in the year 2000,
one of our own accountants from our own documents found that
there was something wrong.

Does that sound like concealment?

No, I don't think so, because all they had to do was look at
their own documents. They had those documents from the very
first day»
What have we got, kind of the case of the purloin
fraud like the purloined letter where we hid the fraud in plain
sight by recording it?
Now if they don't have a duty —

if the statute on

recording doesn't give them some help and give them some
rights, I'd be very surprised.

I think they have a duty to
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I think they have a duty to

2

understand them.

3

just don't do it for three years, that's just too bad.

4

in their capacity to do.

5

was right there, and that's how they found it.

6

They have a duty to do it timely.

THE COURT:

Not ours —

All right.

If they
It was

we didn't hide it.

Thank you, Mr. Adamson.

It

I am

7

persuaded, Mr. Stephens and Ms. White, that the motion

8

pending motions to dismiss are well taken, and I'm going to

9

grant the same for the reasons specified, both here at oral

10
11

argument and in the supporting memoranda.
I'll ask counsel for the defendants, the movements, to

12

prepare the appropriate order and submit it to me.

13

for your presentation, folks.

14

—

Thank you

We'll be in recess.

(Hearing concluded)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RUSSELL/PACKARD
DEVELOPMENT, INC., et al,
PIaintiff(s),

:

MINUTE ENTRY RULING

:

CASE NO. 010910854

:

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

JOEL M. CARSON, et al,

:

Date: June 10,2002

Defendant(s).

:

vs.

After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice to Submit filed June 6,2002,
the Court rules as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' Objection and Amended Objection to Form of Order of Dismissal are denied
for the reasons specified in the opposing memoranda. The Order of Dismissal including the
Complaint and Amended Complaint is executed June 10,2002.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RUSSELL/PACKARD DEVELOPMENT,
INC., a California corporation; and
LAWRENCE M. RUSSELL, an individual,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOEL M. CARSON, an individual;
WILLIAM BUSTOS, an individual; and
JOHN THOMAS, an individual,

Civil No. 010910854
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on Monday, April 29,2002. The plaintiff was
represented by counsel, R. Brent Stephens and Heather S. White, of SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU.

The defendant Carson was represented by Keith W. Meade, of COHNE, RAPPAPORT

& SEGAL. The defendant Bustos was represented by Craig G. Adamson, of DART ADAMSON &
DONOVAN.

The defendant John Thomas was represented by George W. Pratt and Marci

Rechtenbach, of JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH.
The Court, having considered the pleadingsfiledby the parties directed to the defendants'
motions to dismiss, and having considered all of those pleadings, as well as the argument of counsel
at the hearing, and for the reasons advanced by the defendants both in their memorandum and before
51

the Court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint be and

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
postage fully prepaid, on the

day of

, 2002, to the following:

Michael R. Carlston
R. Brent Stephens
Heather S. White
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Craig G. Adamson
DART. ADAMSON & DONOVAN
370 East South Temple. Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
George W. Pratt
Marci Rechtenbach
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
P.O. Box 45444
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-3200
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Search Result

Rank(R) 1 of 3

1

Database
UT-ST

IXT
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART II. Actions, Venue, Limitation of Actions
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
ARTICLE 2. OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY
Copyright (C) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session
-12-25

Within four years.

An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument
writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for
y article charged on a store account; also on an open account for work, labor
services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of
e foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four years after the
st charge is made or the last payment is
received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections
Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1) (a), which in specific situations limits the time
r action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5 (1) (b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1);
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
2DIT
story: L. 1951, ch. 58, s 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, s 14;
J6, ch. 79, s 110.
:.A. 1953 s 78-12-25
ST s 78-12-25
) OF DOCUMENT
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ST S 78-12-26
.C.A. 1953 S 78-12-26

Search Result

Rank(R) 1 of 1

1

Database
UT-ST

XT
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART II. Actions, Venue, Limitation of Actions
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
ARTICLE 2. OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY
Copyright (C) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session
-12-26

Within three years.

An action may be brought within three years:
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except that when
ste or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining
aim, the cause of action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved
rty of the facts constituting such waste or trespass;
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions
r specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where the subject of
e action is a domestic animal usually included in the term "livestock," which
the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if the animal strayed or
s stolen from the true owner without the owner's fault, the cause does not
crue until the owner has actual knowledge of such facts as would put a
asonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the defendant;
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of
tion in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party
the facts constituting the fraud or mistake;
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a
nalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special
ses a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state;
(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except that the cause
action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably should
ow of the harm suffered.
.EDIT
story: L. 1951, ch. 58, s 1; c. 1943, Supp., 104-12-26; L. 1986, ch. 143, s 1;
>96, ch. 79, s 111.
C.A. 1953 s 78-12-26
ST s 78-12-26
D OF DOCUMENT
1
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Search Result
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1

Database
UT-ST

3XT
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART III. Procedure
CHAPTER 27. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Copyright (C) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session
1-27-26 Jurisdiction over nonresidents --Only claims arising from enumerated
:ts may be asserted.
Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against a
ifendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this act.
LEDIT
story: L. 1969, ch. 246, s 5.
C.A. 1953 S 78-27-26
ST s 78-27-26
D OF DOCUMENT
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9

Page

1

WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART m . PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
Copr. ° West Group 2002. All rights reserved.
Current with amendments received through 9-15-2002.
RULE 9. PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS
(aXD Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of
a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized
association of persons that is made a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue
or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall
include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge, and on such
issue the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the
trial.
(2) Designation of Unknown Defendant. When a party does not know the name of an adverse party, he
may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any
pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true name of such adverse party is
ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.
(3) Actions to Quiet Title; Description of Interest of Unknown Parties. In an action to quiet title wherein
any of the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings may describe such
unknown persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest in, or
lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or
clouding his title thereto."
flb) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and
other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.
(c) Conditions Precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is
sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A
denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when so
made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial establish the facts showing
such performance or occurrence.
(d) Official Document or Act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to aver that the
document was issued or the act done in compliance with law.
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasijudicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without
setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made
specifically and with particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or decision
shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts.
(f) Time and Place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and
place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material matter.
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(g) Special Damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated.
(h) Statute of Limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts
showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by the
provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely
by section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon
sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted, the party pleading the statute
must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is so barred.
(i) Private Statutes; Ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance of any
political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer
to such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or other
designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances. The court shall thereupon take
judicial notice thereof.
(j) Libel and Slander.
(1) Pleading Defamatory Matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to set forth any
intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the
action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken concerning
the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter must
establish, on the trial, that it was so published or spoken.
(2) Pleading Defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may allege both
the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the
amount of damages, and, whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence the
mitigating circumstances.
Rules Civ. Proc, Rule 9
UTRRCPRule9
END OF DOCUMENT
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July 15,2003
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse
450 South State Street, 5th Floor
PO BOX 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
Re: State v. Joshua John Earl, Case No. 20020821-CA
Brief of Appellee
To the Clerk of the Court:
It has come to my attention that Addendum A of the State's brief submitted on May 9,
2003 mistakenly included only every other page of the Order Denying Defendant's Motion
to Suppress, R. 127-33 It also came to my attention that the State's citation to State v. Weeks
on page 11 was incomplete and was not included in the Table of Authorities. I am therefore
submitting this brief as a replacement to the one previously filed, which brief includes the
entire order in the Addendum and the full citation. No other changes, substantive or
otherwise, have been made.
Sincerely,

Jeffrey S. Gray
Assistant Attorney General
cc: Joan C. Watt
Catherine E. Lilly
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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July 15,2003
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse
450 South State Street, 5th Floor
PO BOX 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
Re: State v. Joshua John Earl, Case No. 20020821-CA
Brief of Appellee
To the Clerk of the Court:
It has come to my attention that Addendum A of the State's brief submitted on May 9,
2003 mistakenly included only every other page of the Order Denying Defendant's Motion
to Suppress, R. 127-33 It also came to my attention that the State's citation to State v. Weeks
on page 11 was incomplete and was not included in the Table of Authorities. I am therefore
submitting this brief as a replacement to the one previously filed, which brief includes the
entire order in the Addendum and the full citation. No other changes, substantive or
otherwise, have been made.
Sincerely,

Jeffrey S. Gray
Assistant Attorney General
cc: Joan C. Watt
Catherine E. Lilly
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Re: State v. Joshua John Earl, Case No. 20020821-CA
Brief of Appellee
To the Clerk of the Court:
It has come to my attention that Addendum A of the State's brief submitted on May 9,
2003 mistakenly included only every other page of the Order Denying Defendant's Motion
to Suppress, R. 127-33 It also came to my attention that the State's citation to State v. Weeks
on page 11 was incomplete and was not included in the Table of Authorities. I am therefore
submitting this brief as a replacement to the one previously filed, which brief includes the
entire order in the Addendum and the full citation. No other changes, substantive or
otherwise, have been made.
Sincerely,

Jeffrey S. Gray
Assistant Attorney General
cc: Joan C. Watt
Catherine E. Lilly
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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